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MAKING THE COMPETITION FOR HEALTH CARE
DOLLARS A FAIR FIGHT:
THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST LAW IN IMPROVING
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE MARKET
Stephanie A. Alessi*
ABSTRACT
In an effort to slow the ever-increasing costs of health care in the
United States, the U.S. health policy community has highlighted price
transparency as one strategy to give consumers more control over their
health care choices. But to empower consumers requires more than just
making price information available. In certain markets throughout the
country, dominant firms have built up significant market power, which
gives them the leverage to effectively neuter any increase in consumer
power that would be gained from price transparency. Thus, before a price
transparency initiative can be successful, something must be done to break
down the market power that stands in the way of consumer choice.
This article argues that antitrust law may provide the enforcement
tool, or at least the theoretical approach, to facilitate a real effort toward
price transparency. It describes several theories under which an antitrust
lawsuit could be alleged, ranging from challenges against most-favorednation clauses imposed by insurers to unlawful tying arrangements
leveraged by dominant hospital networks, and it analyzes the legal and
policy implications of these claims. In concluding, this article highlights
the best options to address the problems of hidden prices and market
inefficiencies in the health care system, arguing that even if antitrust law is
not the solution, its rationale and policy justifications should nonetheless
support policy efforts to work toward making the price of health care fair,
visible, and efficient.

* Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics, Stanford Center for
Biomedical Ethics, Stanford University. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013;
B.A., Economics, Stanford University, 2009. Thank you to Jaime King and Morgan Muir for all their work
on our price transparency project, without which this article would not have been possible. I would also like
to thank David Faigman, Thomas Greaney, and Ann Marie Marciarille for their comments on earlier
formulations of the ideas in this article, as well as everyone at the UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium for
helping to make this research possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. health policy community, in its continual search for tools to
slow the ever-increasing costs of health care in the United States, has
recently cast its spotlight on the need for transparency in health care
pricing. 1 This concern arises out of a growing realization that different
hospitals' prices for the same service can vary by thousands of dollars,
even for the same patient. 2 Not only do these variations confuse the
already-complicated health care payment system, but the existence of such
a wide disparity in prices also violates basic U.S. notions of fairness and
justice. Price transparency seems to make financial sense for a nation that
is always looking for new ways to lower health care costs. The economic
argument is simple: If health care consumers-patients-know how much
their health services cost, they can choose lower-cost providers and,
collectively, demand lower prices across the board. Prominent health
economists and policymakers have argued that making prices transparent
is an important element of health care reform because it will "allow
consumers to plan ahead and choose lower-cost providers." 3 But, in spite
of price transparency's apparent promise to make health care prices fair, in
practice it may not be as simple a solution as it seems.
In many places across the country, patients cannot respond to price
fluctuations according to a straightforward economic model. Other players
in the complex health care market-most notably, large insurers and
provider networks-often hold substantial amounts of market power and
thus can stand in the way of efforts to effectuate meaningful change for
patients. 4 The underlying issue is intricately tied up with a lack of
transparency, but in many cases hidden prices are only a symptom of the
problem rather than a cause. In certain markets where a small number of
parties have built up market power, those dominant parties can exercise
significant pricing freedom. Because of the convoluted structure of the
U.S. health care and health insurance markets, these parties rarely must
I See,

e.g., Morgan A. Muir, Stephanie A. Alessi, & Jaime S.King, Clarifying Costs: Can IncreasedPrice

TransparencyReduce HealthcareSpending?, 4 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 319 (2013).
2 See, e.g., Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in CaliforniaForeshadowsChallenges to
Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699 (2010); Peter Waldman, Sutter Health's Market Power Is Questioned,

BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
10_36/b4193015983853.htm.
3 Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing HealthcareSpending, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.

949, 951 (2012), availableat http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/I0.1056/NEJMsb 20590 1.
4 The complexity of the health care market also contributes to high transaction costs, which make it even
more difficult to overcome externalities. See Bronwyn Howell, New Zealand Inst. for the Study of
Competition & Regulation Inc. & Victoria Mgmt. Sch., Unveiling 'Invisible Hands': Two-Sided Platforms
in Health Care Markets 4-5 (Mar. 2006).
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answer directly to patients for their high prices, and so the lack of
counterbalancing market forces enables them to continue to leverage their
price-setting power without regard for patient preferences-and often
without even making the prices known to patients. As these dominant
parties continue to raise prices and earn more money, their power grows,
creating a cycle of increasing profits that serves to exacerbate an alreadylopsided wealth distribution.5
As a result, price transparency may be insufficient-and even
counterproductive-to making health care prices fair and affordable. In
markets where patients lack market power, making price information
public could have the unintended consequence of enabling dominant
insurers and/or providers to collude with one another and set prices even
higher.6 Some economists have suggested solving this problem by limiting
the information that is made public, 7 but to do so would also limit the
information that patients are able to use as the basis of their health care
decisions. 8 To respond appropriately to the prices of their health care
options in the marketplace, patients need full information about both the
price and quality of the care they are to receive. 9 How, then, can the public
learn the true value of the health care they pay for while avoiding the risk
of facilitating collusion in certain markets?
It has been suggested that the "aggressive enforcement of antitrust
laws" can help prevent the problem of collusion." This article applies this
suggestion even earlier, before the opportunity to collude arises in the first
place, and argues that antitrust law has a role to play in breaking down
market power as a necessary precursor to health care price transparency
and a tool to increase efficiency in health care markets. Market power is
closely linked to hidden prices and other inefficiencies." Thus, by first
breaking down dominant parties' market power and then mandating price
5 See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 OR.
L. REV. 847, 851 (2011); see also Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win
Steep Payment Increasesfrom Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973,

973 (2012) ("Some health care systems, commonly referred to as 'must-have' providers-meaning
providers that health plans must include in their networks to attract employers and consumers-have used

their clout to raise prices.").
6 David Cutler & Leemore Dafny, Designing TransparencySystems for Medical Care Practices,364 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 894, 894 (2011).
7 See supra.
8 Muir et al., supranote I, at 325.

9 See id. at 323-24.
10 Emanuel et al., supra note 3, at 951.
II Market power is defined as the ability to control prices in the relevant market. Glossary of Statistical
Terms: Market Power, OECD.ORG, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3256 (last updated Mar. 16,
2002); see also infra Part I.C.2.
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transparency, it may be possible to give patients the leverage to demand
prices that are fair, visible, and efficient. 12 This article argues that antitrust
law may provide the enforcement tool, or at least the theoretical approach,
to facilitate a real effort toward fair and transparent prices.
Part I of this article provides background on federal and state antitrust
law. It briefly describes some of the most important U.S. antitrust laws and
considers the implications of market definition in the health care industry.
Then, Part 1I examines a current trend in antitrust challenges in the health
care industry: most-favored-nation clauses. Ultimately, however, it argues
that while such challenges may provide some benefit to consumers, they
likely will not be sufficient to bring about fair and transparent prices for
patients. Next, Part III explores the various types of tying arrangementsmost notably, ties created by large hospital networks-that may give rise
to antitrust scrutiny. It analyzes the legal theories that would support such
claims and the implications of these various claims from both a legal and a
policy standpoint. In concluding, this article highlights the best options to
address the problems of hidden prices and market inefficiencies in the
health care system, arguing that even if antitrust law is not the solution, its
rationale and policy justifications should nonetheless support policy efforts
to solve this problem.
I. ANTITRUST LAW AND HEALTH CARE MARKET
DEFINITION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The antitrust laws were crafted to discourage behaviors that could
cause harm to consumers in a competitive market. Importantly, antitrust
law focuses on consumer welfare, in contrast to activities that may harm a
competitor.13 In the health care industry, this means that antitrust law aims
to enable patients to respond to price and quality information about health
care services in a way that reflects their values. Thus, an antitrust suit in
this context would challenge the unreasonable business practices of the
dominant parties that keep patients from being able to exercise their
preferences and thereby facilitate high prices. This part provides an
overview of the federal and state (using California as an illustrative
example) antitrust laws under which such a challenge could be brought.

12 See Muir et al., supra note 1, at 365.

13 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 4 (1997). As antitrust scholar Robert Bork explains, the
public policy goal of antitrust law is to protect competition, not competitors. See ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978) ("The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization
of consumer welfare .... ").
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A. Federal Law
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") enforce federal antitrust law on behalf of the United
States. 14 Private individuals-usually competitors or consumers-who can
show that they have been injured by anticompetitive behavior, can also sue
privately for treble damages. 15 To prove the injury necessary to have
standing to bring a private antitrust suit, a competitor must show both a
tendency of the alleged violation to reduce competition in a certain market
and an injury resulting from that decrease in competition-that is, not
from another of the defendant's actions that does not violate antitrust
law. 16 Even if not yet injured, a 17plaintiff may seek injunctive relief against
the threat of competitive injury.
The Sherman Act is the primary vehicle for U.S. antitrust
enforcement, 18 and it provides two theories of antitrust liability: (1)
unlawful agreements in restraint of trade and (2) single-firm
monopolization or attempted monopolization. By challenging the
lawfulness of these business practices, it may be possible to lessen the
ability of powerful actors to conceal prices from other parties-including
consumers-and to enable both price competition and closer regulatory
scrutiny to help reduce their negotiating leverage. 19

1. Sherman Act § 1-Unlawful Agreements
Section One of the Sherman Act prohibits multiple parties from
engaging in a contract, combination, or conspiracy that constitutes an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 20 To prove a Section One violation, a
plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a multi-party agreement 2 1 and
14 The two agencies share jurisdiction over health care industries, allocating cases under a process known
as "clearance."
15 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The Clayton Act allows a plaintiff to enforce the "antitrust laws," which
include the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, as well as portions of other federal laws. Id. § 12.
16 Tennessean Truckstop, Inc. v. NTS, Inc., 875 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1989).
17 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
18 The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act also govern U.S. antitrust law. They are not
discussed in detail in this article but substantively are largely similar to the Sherman Act. Other laws
governing merger analysis are outside the scope of this article.
19 See Berenson et al., supra note 5, at 979.
20 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
21 To successfully allege a violation of Section One, it is crucial that there be two parties, because a single
party cannot make an agreement with itself. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)
("In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the
long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in
advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.").
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(2) that the agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade.22 Types of
agreements that are illegal under Section One include those that amount to
price fixing, market allocation, output restrictions, or stabilizing prices
using non-price controls, as well as other agreements that are found to
unreasonably restrain trade.
Although some agreements, such as price fixing among competitors,
constitute per se antitrust violations, modem courts generally apply the
"rule of reason" to test whether the anticompetitive harm of a particular
restraint might be outweighed by pro-competitive benefits.23 In applying
the rule of reason to an alleged violation, "the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances" to determine if the agreement is an unreasonable restraint
of trade, looking first to the plaintiffs allegations of anticompetitive harm
and then to the defendant's arguments about the pro-competitive benefits
that arise from the restraint. 24 Relevant factors in this fact-intensive
the history and
analysis may include information about the business,
25
power.
market
business's
the
and
restraint,
the
of
nature

2. Sherman Act § 2-Monopolization and Attempted
Monopolization
Section Two of the Sherman Act forbids a party with monopoly
power from willfully acquiring or maintaining that power. 26 Simply

gaining monopoly power by "skill, foresight and industry," however, does
not constitute a violation of antitrust law. 27 Thus, a monopolist does not
necessarily violate Section Two if it built up its power by lawful means,
but such a firm has a heightened obligation to avoid willfully maintaining
its monopoly status.
Section Two also forbids attempted monopolization. Attempted
monopolization claims require that the plaintiff prove "(1) that the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power," which is measured by the defendant's ability to
22 For an agreement to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, either the two parties must be competitors or
the agreement must directly affect others in the market. In the context of health care, this means that certain
agreements between insurers and providers do not constitute unreasonable restraints of trade, because they
do not directly impact competition. See, e.g., Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d
1433 (5th Cir. 1984).
23 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007).
24 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
25 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
26 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
27 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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foreclose competition in the relevant market.2 8 This analysis requires
consideration of the defendant firm's economic power, including a
calculation of market share, in the relevant product and geographic
29
markets.
B. State Law: California
In addition to the Sherman Act and other federal laws, state
governments can also raise antitrust challenges under state antitrust laws.
Because this article focuses on the policy rationales underlying antitrust
law-not the intricacies of each individual state's law-it does not attempt
to analyze the details of all fifty states' antitrust laws. Rather, it uses
California law as an example of how state law can supplement federal law
in an antitrust suit. By way of illustration, two California statutes are
noteworthy: the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law.
1. California Cartwright Act
California's primary antitrust law is the Cartwright Act.3" The
Cartwright Act is similar to Section One of the Sherman Act in that it
prohibits certain restraints of trade. Unlike the Sherman Act, the
Cartwright Act specifies several types of agreements that are unlawfulfor example, price fixing, market allocation, and exclusive dealing.3 1 Still,
it is well established in California case law that the Cartwright Act is
modeled after the Sherman Act and therefore, for analytical purposes,
federal interpretation of the Sherman Act also applies to the Cartwright
Act.32 Consequently, while this article does not explicitly differentiate
between federal and state law in its analysis, the same or similar arguments
can be used in either jurisdiction.
2. California Unfair Competition Law
Although the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") is not an
antitrust law per se, it can be used as a catch-all for anticompetitive
behavior that does not necessarily constitute a violation of a specific law
but that still causes harm to consumers. 33 The statute defines "unfair
competition" as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
28
29
30
31
32
33

Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
at 459.
Id.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720-28.
Seeid.§§ 16720, 16727.
Main Cnty. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 925 (1976).
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 17200-10.
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practice" and provides a cause of action for injunctive relief, civil
penalties, and/or restitutionary damages for engaging in unfair
competition. 34 Because the UCL is not limited to "unlawful" practice but
also encompasses "unfair" and "fraudulent" acts, it applies to a broader
scope of actions beyond just violations of specific antitrust laws. 35 The
California Supreme Court has defined unfair competition as "conduct that
threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable or the same
as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms
competition." 36 Therefore, analyzing an allegation of competitive harm
under the UCL is largely parallel to the analysis of specific antitrust
violations, but it also covers conduct that may not rise to the level of an
explicit violation. The UCL thus offers a useful vehicle for challenging
acts that harm competition in California, notwithstanding any
determinations about liability under the antitrust-specific laws.
C. Market Analysis in the California Health Care Industry
When applying any of these antitrust laws, a critical step in the
inquiry is to measure the defendant firm's market power in the relevant
market. This requires initial analysis to define the relevant product and
geographic markets, followed by an evaluation of the defendant firm's
market power therein in order to determine if it is sufficient to control
prices. Because of the unique features of the health care market, this can
be a difficult task and has in fact proved to be a significant hurdle in some
lawsuits. 37 This section considers each of these issues in turn.
1. Defining the Market
To establish whether a party has power in a specific market for
purposes of antitrust analysis, it is first necessary to define the relevant
product and geographic markets in which the party operates. To do so
requires asking: What is the smallest set of products and geographic area
in which the party would be able to raise and sustain prices? This section
addresses how this question is answered in the health care market.
34 See id. §§ 17200, 17203, 17206, 17206.1.
35 Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 560-61 (1999); see also id. at 563
(stating that acts that have explicitly been deemed lawful are not actionable under the UCL, but those that
have neither been deemed lawful nor unlawful may be).
36 Id.at 565.
37 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. C 12-04854 LB (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 7, 2013) (finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately define the relevant markets and dismissing
complaint with leave to amend).
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a. Product Market
The relevant product market is the group of products that constitute
reasonable substitutes for each other. This determination depends on
consumers' cross-elasticity of demand: If the price of the product
increases, the products with which consumers would replace it are part of
the relevant product market. 38 Antitrust plaintiffs generally try to define
very specific product markets in order to increase the likelihood that the
defendant will be found to be dominant in that small market.
In the hospital industry, however, courts have tended to view the
product market broadly, as a single "cluster market" that encompasses all
inpatient services, rather than viewing each individual service as a separate
product. 39 Some legal scholars have challenged this reliance on cluster
markets, arguing that defining hospital services so broadly "obscures high
levels of concentration" that would otherwise open dominant parties to
antitrust enforcement. 40 But despite these concerns, it is typical for
antitrust litigants in the health care industry to allege a product market that
includes a broad swath of "inpatient services" without distinguishing
between individual services. For example, in the recently filed case Sidibe
v. Sutter Health, a class action antitrust suit against a large hospital
network, the plaintiffs alleged a relevant product market consisting of
"Inpatient Hospital Services."' 41 The plaintiffs noted: "Although Individual
Hospital Services are not substitutes for each other (e.g., obstetrics and
cardiac services are not substitutes for each other), the various individual
Inpatient Hospital Services can be aggregated for analytic convenience and
has so been aggregated by courts, antitrust enforcers, and industry sources
"42 Thus, notwithstanding the arguments in favor of more specific
....
product market definition, it is a well-established practice in the health
care industry to use the cluster market approach to defining the relevant
product market as all "inpatient hospital services."

38 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1956).
39 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 869 (citing In re Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 455 (1985),
aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986)). Havighurst and Richman go on to cite Ian Ayres, Rationalizing
Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109 (1985), for the proposition that "the cluster-market approach
may be justified where goods or services are in some way complementary in production, consumption, or
distribution." Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 869 n.63. This is especially relevant for analyzing
tying claims. See infra Part III.A.
40 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 869.
41 Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. 3:12-cv-4854-LB, at
12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).
42 Id. The plaintiffs specifically excluded from the product market military or veterans' hospitals, sameday outpatient services, and "psychiatric, substance abuse, and rehabilitation services." Id.
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b. Geographic Market
The geographic market is defined by where the seller operates and
where consumers look to purchase the product. 43 In the case of a hospital,
the boundaries of the geographic market depend not only on the hospital's
service area, but also on the existence of barriers to entry for competitors
and on consumers' ability to switch to other hospitals. 44 How the party
itself defines the geographic market may also be relevant. The California
Health and Safety Code, for instance, requires that all health plans identify
their prospective enrollees' general geographic areas and report the
providers available therein. 45 Other measures define geographic areas by
using geo-political boundaries, such as by combining zip codes. For
example, using the "Geozip" method, the San Francisco area would
include all zip codes beginning with 941.4
In merger cases, market definition is generally established with the
"hypothetical monopolist" test. The hypothetical monopolist test asks what
the smallest possible set of products and geographic area is in which a
profit-maximizing firm with no competition could sustain a "small but
significant and non-transitory" price increase. 47 Essentially, this test asks
whether the merger creates a danger that the firm could get away with
anticompetitive behavior-that is, whether the merger would give it
enough power to be able to raise prices at its whim, without losing
43 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) ("[T]he area of effective competition
in the known line of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably tum for supplies. In short, the threatened foreclosure
of competition must be in relation to the market affected.").
44 Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. Nat'l Med. Enters., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1511 (D. S.C. 1987) ("Because we
are concerned only with an area in which competition could be harmed, the relevant geographic market
must be broad enough that buyers would be unable to switch to alternative sellers in sufficient numbers to
defeat an exercise of market power by firms in the area." (quoting Matter of Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106
F.T.C. 361, 466 (1995), affd, Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987)). Recent antitrust history, however, has tended to overestimate the size of geographic markets in
hospital merger analyses. Thomas L. Greaney, Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary United
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet on
"Health Care Consolidation and Competition After PPACA" 4 (May 18, 2012), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/-files/hearings/Hearings%20201 2/Greaney%2005182012.pdf; see also FED.
TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, ch. 4, at 6
(July 2004) [hereinafter IMPROVING HEALTH CARE] (recognizing consistent criticism that the ElzingaHogarty test should not be the only basis for defining the geographic market).
45 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.26(a)(1).
46 See, e.g., Ingenix, Benchmark Products Presentation (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/
aboutthedmhc/org/boards/fssb/notes/050419ipp.pdf. Ingenix (now known as Optumlnsight) performs
efficiency analyses for health care actors and government agencies; it has evaluated California's health care
market and separated the state into twenty-eight different geographic areas based on its "Geozip" coding
system. See id at 10; see also Optumlnsight, Government: Improve Health Outcomes, Reduce Costs and
Increase Efficiency, http://www.optuminsight.com/govemment.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
47 IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 44, ch. 6, at 4
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customers. In hospital mergers specifically, courts use the "ElzingaHogarty" test to define the hospital's geographic market. The ElzingaHogarty test considers evidence 48
of how many patients leave or enter a
specific area for hospital services:
[I]f the patient flow data show large numbers of patients coming
into or going out of the area for inpatient hospital care, then the
geographic market is hypothesized to be broader than originally
thought . . . . A geographic market definition is usually
described as 'strong' if less than 10 percent of discharged
patients from the merging hospitals' area come into or out of the
49
area.
Critics of this methodology, however, point out that patient migration
does not necessarily mean that a patient "would respond to a small price
increase by using hospitals outside of the merging hospitals' core
geographic area," because it ignores the many other reasons a patient
might travel for health care services.50 That is to say, this kind of data does
not show how patients would react to an increase in price and therefore
does not prove anything about the substitutability of hospitals.5 ' In fact,
empirical studies have shown that most patients do not "view distant
hospitals as close substitutes for most services," but rather that those
individuals that do travel have "distinct reasons" for doing so and thus do
'' 2
not "inhibit merging local hospitals from increasing prices substantially. s
Therefore, in spite of the existence of a number of measures for defining a
hospital's relevant geographic market, it is questionable whether these
methods provide a fully accurate picture of those markets. Instead, these
tests represent a crude attempt to apply market analysis to an industry that
does not behave like a typical economic market. As a result, even if an
antitrust lawsuit is supported by economic evidence about anticompetitive
behavior in the health care marketplace, it may be difficult to establish
liability due to the industry's lack of accurate market measures.
In a complaint recently filed in the Northern District of California,
defining the geographic market has been an early center of contention. In
Sidibe v. Sutter Health, after the court dismissed an earlier complaint for a
48 Id. ch. 4, at 7-8.
49 Id. ch. 4, at 8.
50 Id. (citing reasons such as "perceived and actual variations in quality, insurance coverage, out-of-pocket
cost, sophistication of services, and family connections").
51 Id.
52 Id.ch. 4, at 9 (quoting CORY CAPPS ET AL., THE SILENT MAJORITY FALLACY OF THE ELZINGAHOGARTY CRITERIA: A CRITIQUE AND NEW APPROACH TO ANALYZING HOSPITAL MERGERS 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w8216, 2001)).
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failure to identify specific local geographic markets,5 3 the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to allege fourteen specific hospital service areas
54
in Northern California as defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.
The Dartmouth Atlas, a "well-established industry authority," defines
health service areas as "a collection of ZIP codes whose residents receive
most of their hospitalizations from the hospitals in that area." 5 5 This
definition, the plaintiffs argued, also comports with the requirements of the
California Knox-Keene Act regarding the geographic reach of hospitals
covered by health plans.5 6 They further alleged six somewhat-broader
"Metropolitan Statistical Areas," as defined by the Office of Management
and Budget's analysis of census data, as relevant geographic markets for
the sale of health plans.5 7 If the court accepts these data-backed methods
of geographic market definition, it could establish these tools as standard
measurements of health care market size and facilitate future antitrust
challenges. Moreover, in the immediate case, this could finally open the
door for a substantive argument about the legality of the defendant's
alleged unlawful business practices.
2. Measuring Market Power
Once a plaintiff has crossed the not-insignificant hurdle of defining
the relevant market, the question arises whether the defendant has market
power. That is, does the defendant have the ability to control prices in the
relevant market as it has been defined? A party's market share provides a
useful starting point to measure market power. However, market share
rarely offers a complete picture of a firm's actual ability to control prices.
Circumstantial factors such as barriers to entry and the ability of
competitors to increase output in the short run also prove crucial to
measuring market power.
In the California health care market, for instance, looking only at
percentage market share often significantly underestimates a party's actual
market power. This is due to a number of factors, including regulatory
barriers to entry such as those controlled by the Department of Managed
Health Care, as well as the inclusion of Kaiser Permanente's hospitals in
market share analysis despite the fact that these facilities are only
53 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. C 12-04854 LB, at 17-18 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 7, 2013).
54 Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. 3:12-cv-4854-LB, at
7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).
55 Id.
561d. at 13-14.

57 Id. at 20-24.
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accessible to Kaiser plan members.5 8 Moreover, certain hospitals enjoy
significant consumer demand due to their reputation or their ability to
provide specialized services. This heightened demand, while not
necessarily reflected in a straightforward market share analysis, often
provides enough leverage so that it is implausible for insurers to threaten
exclusion during health plan contract negotiations.5 9 Therefore, an analysis
of market power must consider not only market share, but also the whole
ecosystem in which a party operates: the presence and qualities of
competitors, regulatory and market barriers to entry, actual prices charged,
leverage due to economic and non-economic factors alike, and the overall
economic impact of the party in question on competition.
By identifying those parties that have substantial amounts of market
power-not just high percentages of market share-and challenging any
anticompetitive behaviors in which they are engaging, it may be possible
to realign the health care market to give consumers leverage to demand the
services they need at fair prices. In an effort to discern the link between
increased health care prices and market power, the California Attorney
General's office has recently been examining health care consolidation
practices and "probing whether mergers of hospitals and doctor groups are
pushing up prices."' 60 This attention puts a spotlight on issues including
"hospital systems' reimbursement from ... insurers" and "whether the
systems' tie-ups with physicians, as well as ownership of hospitals, have
given them the market power to boost prices in a way that violates antitrust
law."' 61 However, hospital leverage is driven by many factors, not just
consolidation. 62 Thus, instead of waiting for the threat of consolidation,
these enforcement efforts should be aimed at all restrictive practices in

58 Letter from Blue Shield of California to Federal Trade Commission dated May 27, 2011, at 3. Blue
Shield explains some of these factors in a section of its letter to the FTC titled "Need for Stricter Market

Share Screens":
[M]arket shares of providers located in areas near Kaiser facilities are understated because Kaiser's large
network is included when their market shares are calculated even though the Kaiser facilities are not
available to competing payers. In addition, health plans must obtain advance permission from the

Department of Managed Health Care to transfer members from a provider that is being removed from a
network. These providers often insist, and sometimes persuade the Department, that alternative providers

are not adequate substitutes, leaving the health plan with no choice but to negotiate with the incumbent
provider who has been given significant leverage.
Id. Blue Cross also describes hospital systems' practices of negotiating on an "all-or-nothing" basis as
contributing to certain providers' market power, despite having "shares well below the 30 percent primary
service area" threshold set by the FTC. Id.
59 Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 702.
60 Anna Wilde Mathews, Doctor,Hospital Deals Probed,WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012, at B1.
61 Id.
62 Berenson et al., supra note 5, at 975.
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order to more effectively prevent and correct for the continued aggregation
of market power among dominant parties.
In particular, the negotiation process between providers and insurers,
though often hidden from the public eye, is a crucial point at which
powerful parties can leverage their power to artificially raise prices.
Because it is all but invisible to health care consumers, it creates an
opportunity for anticompetitive behavior to transpire. The resulting
contracts may include provisions that either directly make accurate price
information about services unavailable or indirectly contribute to powerful
parties' maintenance of their market power by protecting their position in
the market. The next two parts elaborate on several ways in which antitrust
law can address the inefficiencies created during this process.
I1.
HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRACT PROVISIONS:
UNREASONABLE RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
In negotiations for health plan contracts, powerful parties sometimes
seek to include contractual language that preserves their dominance. Under
Section One of the Sherman Act, some of these terms in contracts between
insurers and providers may rise to the level of being anticompetitive.
Because insurers and providers do not compete with each other, however,
it can be difficult to prove that agreements between the two, which
otherwise might appear to restrain trade under Section One, cause harm to
competition instead of simply being smart business tactics. 6 3 As such, the
terms that pose potential antitrust issues are those that affect the prices that
competitors of the agreeing parties can set.64 That is, if a transaction
between a provider and an insurer depends on the "specifics of a different
buyer-seller relationship involving at least one of the same parties," or if
either party needs to "know the details of a rival's contract" to determine
the final price or terms of the contract, the clause is potentially
65
anticompetitive.
63 See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding no
horizontal restraint of trade in an agreement between an insurer and pharmacies, despite the appearance of
collusion between the pharmacies as a result of the insurer-pharmacy agreements). In Royal Drug, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the insurer, "by engaging in procompetitive conduct in the insurance
business, . . . bec[a]me a price-fixer in the retail drug business because its method of competition [sought]
to bring its customers the maximum insurance reimbursement." Id.at 1438. Rather, the court found that the
insurer and the pharmacies "sit on opposite sides of the bargaining table. Absent any evidence of the
presence and abuse of monopoly power, [the insurer] has the clear right to bargain for the lowest price and
best deal for itself and its customers/insureds." Id.
64 See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Daniel P. Weick, Contracts That Reference Rivals as an Antitrust
Category, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Apr. 2012), http://www.wsgr.com/publications[PDFSearch/jacobson-

0412.pdf.
65 FIONA SCOTT-MORTON, DOJ, CONTRACTS THAT REFERENCE RIVALS 3 (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
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Perhaps the most notable of these contract provisions is the mostfavored nation ("MFN") clause. MFN clauses, a form of payment parity
agreement, guarantee insurers that they are receiving a provider's best
rates and limit the prices that providers can charge to other insurers-a
practice that opens the door to the possibility of antitrust liability. MFN
clauses allow insurers to pay certain providers higher rates "in return for
the hospitals' charging competing plans even higher rates, potentially
raising prices for everyone." 6 6 As prices rise, consumers suffer a
competitive harm in the form of higher prices that they would not have
paid if not for the provision. In addition, the provider loses any incentive it
might have had to offer lower prices, because it must offer that same low
price to all insurers. The result is an increased equilibrium price. 67 MFN
clauses therefore not only force higher prices upon consumers, but they
also reduce any incentive to make prices transparent, which, in many
cases, exacerbates the harm to consumers. 68 Where this harm can be
shown, antitrust law may offer a remedy.
In Massachusetts, the state Attorney General has argued that MFN
clauses have the potential to harm competition by locking in payment
levels, thwarting innovation, and preventing price competition. 69 The
Massachusetts Attorney General's report describes how these contracts
can harm competition:
Parity clauses may decrease competition among providers by
reducing their incentive to offer lower prices to insurers.
Likewise, parity clauses may reduce insurers' incentive to
bargain with providers, since rival insurance companies with
parity provisions would obtain any price savings. Parity clauses
may also deter entry to the marketplace since any discount
would have to be passed on to insurers already in the market...
[T]hese agreements may have the net effect of allowing
insurers to increase payment to providers without concern70that
they will be at a competitive disadvantage to other insurers.

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf.
66 Berenson et al., supra note 5, at 978.
67 See SCOTr-MORTON, supra note 65, at 12.
68 See Muir et al., supra note 1, at 359.
69 OFFICE OF MASS. ATT'Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND
COST

DRIVERS

PURSUANT

TO

G.L.C.

118G,

§

6 (b),

http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/
healthcare/20 I0-hcctd.pdf.
70 Id.
at 41; see also SCOTT-MORTON,supra note 65, at 12-13.

at

40-41

(2010),

available at
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Applying a rule of reason analysis, if these competitive harms are not
outweighed by counterbalancing pro-competitive effects, the use of an
MFN clause to unfairly raise prices would lay the groundwork for a strong
argument that this practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade
under Section One of the Sherman Act or under a comparable state statute.
Recently, the DOJ challenged Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan's
use of MFN clauses on this theory, alleging that it has reduced competition
in the market. 7' Aetna subsequently brought a private suit alleging that it
was harmed by the reduction of market competition, 72 which was followed
by a consumer class action seeking "overcharges paid by purchasers of
Hospital Healthcare Services directly to hospitals in Michigan that resulted
from the anticompetitive acts of Blue Cross."' 73 In the class action, the
plaintiffs describe how they have been harmed by the MFN scheme as
follows:
In exchange for the MFNs, Blue Cross agreed to pay higher
hospital charges to many hospitals throughout Michigan. Instead
of using its market position as Michigan's largest commercial
health insurer to negotiate against a hospital's proposed price
increases, Blue Cross accepted these increases as a means to
secure the MFN provisions. . . . As a result of this
anticompetitive scheme, prices for Hospital Healthcare Services
in Michigan rose, and members of the Class of direct purchasers
... paid artificially inflated prices. 74
Although all three lawsuits survived the defendant's initial motions to
dismiss, 75 on March 25, 2013, a week after the enactment of a Michigan
law prohibiting MFNs in contracts between health insurers and providers,
76
the DOJ and Blue Cross filed a joint motion to dismiss the DOJ's case.
71 United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss). According to the DOJ's complaint, Blue Cross Blue Shield dominates the
Michigan insurance market with anywhere from 40% to 80% market share across different geographic
areas. See Complaint, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No.2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM, at
13 & 28. (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010).
72 Aetna Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 2012-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 77,937, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82621 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2012) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).

78,156,
73 The Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 2012-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
125,625, No. 10-14360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170201 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2012) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss).
74 Id. 125,625-26.
75 To survive a motion to dismiss, an antitrust complaint must allege enough facts so that the court will
find the claim plausible and "raise a reasonable expectation" that, in the course of the lawsuit, evidence of
an unlawful agreement will be uncovered. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
76 Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Files Motion to Dismiss
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The state law, which was set to go into effect on January 1, 2014,77 in
combination with a February 2013 order from the Michigan Insurance
Commissioner making MFNs in health insurance contracts unenforceable,
rendered "the injunctive relief sought by the DOJ and State of Michigan..
•unnecessary. '78 The private suits, however, are still proceeding through
discovery as of the date of this writing. To prevail, the plaintiffs will
eventually need to prove that any alleged pro-competitive benefits of the
MFN clauses outweigh the anticompetitive aspects thereof.
Other types of contractual provisions might also make providers or
insurers susceptible to antitrust liability if they harm consumers. For
example, a firm that uses its market power to demand exclusionary
discounts has the potential to impact competition and therefore can lead to
antitrust liability. 79 As with MFN clauses, courts will carefully analyze
these contractual provisions to determine if their pro-competitive impact
a provision's
effect. Where
their anticompetitive
outweighs
viewed as an
may
be
it
benefits,
its
than
is
greater
impact
anticompetitive
unreasonable restraint of trade that will be subject to antitrust enforcement.
Many antitrust cases based on contractual provisions end in consent
decrees enjoining enforcement of the terms in question rather than
threatening offenders with treble damages.8 0 This threat, therefore, may
not be a sufficient incentive to lead to any measurable change. Regulatory
measures forbidding such clauses, like the one recently enacted in
Michigan, may be equally effective as, and less costly than, litigation that
can drag on for years. Thus, although antitrust law offers a potentially
useful legal tool to end anticompetitive contract terms, regulatory change
may be the preferable approach in these cases.

Antitrust Lawsuit Against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan After Michigan Passes Law to Prohibit
Health Insurers from Using Most Favored Nation Clauses in Provider Contracts (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/March/13-at-345.html.

77 Id.
78 Press Release, Blue Cross Blue Shield Blue Care Network, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, U.S.

Department of Justice and State of Michigan Jointly File to Dismiss Antitrust Case (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.bcbsm.com/content/microsites/blue-cross-blue-shield-of-michigan-news/en/index/newsreleases/2013/march-2013/bcbsm-doj-dismiss-antitrust.html.
79 United States v. United Regional Health Care System, Case No. 7:11 -cv-0030-O, at 5 (Sept. 29, 2011)
(final judgment prohibiting exclusionary conduct).
80 Jacobson & Weick, supra note 64, at 3-4 (citing United States v. Or. Dental Serv., No. C95-1211 FMS,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21042 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1995); RxCare of Tenn., Inc., 121 F.T.C. 762 (1996)). A
consent decree is simply a stipulation by the offending party that it will cease its illegal conduct, in exchange
for withdrawal of the lawsuit.
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III. LINKED HEALTH CARE SERVICES: UNLAWFUL TIES,
(ATTEMPTED) MONOPOLIZATION, AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION
Contract language, of course, is not the only place where potential
antitrust violations can arise. Enforcers should also look to parties'
behavior for evidence of unfair business practices. Specifically, this part
considers the application of antitrust law to the unreasonable use of
leverage during contract negotiations. In certain areas, hospital networksespecially those that include hospitals that dominate particular marketshave significant negotiating power over even the most dominant
insurers. 81 When networks actively seek to increase the leverage they
already have by engaging in anticompetitive practices such as linking
hospitals in distinct geographic locations or bundling unrelated services
without legitimate business justifications, they artificially inflate prices
and contribute to the inefficient market conditions that make health care so
unaffordable for many consumers. These practices allow hospital networks
to condition an insurance contract within one product or geographic
market on the purchase of services in a separate market, and consequently
they at least raise the question of legality under the antitrust laws. This part
describes several potential antitrust challenges to address these practices
under the laws of unlawful tying, monopolization or attempted
monopolization, and unfair competition.
A. Unlawful Tying
One way to challenge these behaviors is as examples of unlawful
tying under Section One of the Sherman Act. A tie is prohibited when a
company uses its market power in one product to coerce the purchase of a
second, separate product. 82 An unlawful tie exists when there are (1) two
separate products involved, (2) a tie requiring the purchase of the tied
product as a condition of buying the tying product, (3) sufficient market
power in the tying product to make the coercion possible, and (4) a not
insubstantial effect on interstate commerce in the tied product's market.8 3
For example, if a supermarket sold flour to customers only if they also
bought sugar, that would clearly satisfy the first two elements: (1) flour
81 Berenson et al., supra note 5, at 974. "[A] leading form of consolidation is the multihospital system
extending across large geographic areas, which in most cases does not lead to antitrust scrutiny. Id.at 978-

79.
82 Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
83 IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supranote 44, ch. 4, at 40; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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and sugar are two separate products, and (2) the purchase of sugar (the tied
product) is a condition of the purchase of flour (the tying product).
However, a plaintiff must also show that the store has (3) sufficient market
power in flour, and that the tie creates (4) a significant impact on the sugar
market to establish that the tie is an unreasonable and unlawful restraint. If
such a tie is present, it can be challenged by either a purchaser who has
been forced to buy the tied product or a competitor who has been
prevented from competing in the tied product's market as a result of the
84
illegal tie.
Most cases, however, are not as cut-and-dry as the example of flour
and sugar. Each element requires careful consideration. Courts analyze the
first element using the separate products test, which asks whether there is
sufficient consumer demand for each of the two products such that a
supplier would provide each product separately. 85 The second and third
elements require a factual determination of the presence of market power
and its use to coerce the purchase of the tied product. These elements
measure to what extent the seller had and exploited its dominance "to
force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did
not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms." 86 Finally, to determine whether there was a serious enough effect
on interstate commerce to satisfy the fourth element, the plaintiff must
allege evidence showing the foreclosure of a substantial amount of
competition.8 7 All four of these elements must be met in order for a court
to hold a party liable for unlawful tying.
Moreover, modem courts tend to analyze the market realities using
the rule of reason to determine if the tie might be pro-competitive, because
a tie may be an effective and efficient means of competition and therefore
"entirely consistent with the Sherman Act." 88 That is, the party
challenging the tie must demonstrate that the arrangement aims to
foreclose competition in the tied market and that it is not outweighed by
pro-competitive benefits. This approach recognizes the distinction between
engaging in legal business practices to maximize return on the tying
product and actually imposing restraints that insulate a "potentially inferior

84 Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1266 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006).
85 Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 21-22.
86 Id.at 12.
87 Gordon v. Lewiston Hosp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 393, 447 (M.D. Pa. 2003), affd, 423 F.3d 184 (3d Cir.
2005) (affirming dismissal in part because plaintiff "failed to present any evidence regarding either the
patient volume effect or the dollar volume of business that has been affected by the tied market").
88 Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 12.
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product" from competition. 89 For example, there is economic evidence that
integrating or bundling health care services can sometimes be efficient, so
courts analyze factors such as whether there is a business justification for
the tie or whether there is a less restrictive alternative. 90 Only after
considering these arguments will a court find a tying arrangement
unlawful. This section analyzes to what extent hospital networks'
negotiation tactics satisfy the elements of an unlawful tie and whether any
justifications exist for those business practices.
1. Geographic Tying
One application of antitrust law's prohibition against tying is on the
link between hospital services in one geographic market where the hospital
has market power (the tying product) to its services in a second market
(the tied product). Insurance company Blue Shield points out that "an
increasing number of provider networks in multiple geographic areas in
California have insisted Blue Shield contract with them on an 'all-ornothing' basis-meaning that Blue Shield must contract with their
providers in every geographic location or none at all." 91 Blue Shield
argues that this harms competition by allowing the provider network to
increase rates and impose non-price requirements that prevent costcontainment and price transparency. 92 Similarly, the Massachusetts
Special Commission on Provider Price Reform has recommended
prohibiting "any contracting practices that require insurers to contract with
all provider locations for a multi-location provider, rather than contracting
only with the individual provider locations with which an insurer may
wish to contract," as well as "any contracting practices that require payers
to pay the same or similar prices to all provider locations for a multilocation health care provider where geographic differences in the
provider's site do not support charging the same or similar prices. '93 To
date, no plaintiff has won a lawsuit alleging this behavior as a violation of
antitrust law. 94 However, to the extent that it falls under the authority of
89 Id. at 14.

90 IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 44, ch. 3, at 39-40; Berenson et al., supra note 5, at 977;
Mathews, supra note 60, at B 1.
91 Letter from Blue Shield of California to Federal Trade Commission dated May 27, 2011, supranote 58,
at 3.
92 Id. at 4.
93 Mass. Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON

PROVIDER PRICE REFORM 25 (Nov. 9, 2011). The Special Commission is made of members including
public health officers, legislators on health committees, officers of insurance and hospital organizations,
and health economists. Id.
at i.
94 This track record may change, however, depending on the outcome of the class action Sidibe v. Sutter
Health. See Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. 3:12-cv-
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the antitrust laws, courts should recognize geographic tying as a practice
that harms competition.
Importantly, hospital networks that take advantage of their leverage
to raise prices are distinct from the provider networks created under the
Affordable Care Act known as Accountable Care Organizations
("ACOs"). ACOs aim to coordinate care between providers and thereby
increase efficiency on a systematic level. 95 Some economists, however,
have expressed concerns that the increasing numbers of ACOs could
encourage consolidation and give the resulting organizations leverage to
"drive up health costs and limit patient choice."'96 Recognizing this
possibility, the DOJ and the FTC issued an antitrust enforcement policy to
guide the application of antitrust law to ACOs. 97 The policy statement
clarifies that the rule of reason will be used to analyze "[j]oint price
agreements among competing health care providers . . . if the providers are
financially or clinically integrated and the agreement is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the procompetitive benefits of the integration." 98
Specifically, it notes that ACOs that meet the eligibility requirements put
forth by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid ("CMS") are "reasonably
likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to improve the quality, and
reduce the costs, of providing medical and other health care services
through their participants' joint efforts." 99 Thus, although some ACOs
may still give rise to concerns about consolidation, those that meet CMS
criteria are outside the scope of this article, both because of their likely
pro-competitive benefits and because of the antitrust agencies' explicit
policy statement.
Therefore, the geographic tying claims described in this section apply
only to networks of hospitals that cause actual economic harm. To warrant
a finding of liability, each element of an unlawful tie must be present. This
means that a court must (1) be willing to view the same health service
offered in the two geographic markets as separate products that may be
4854-LB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).
95 Jenny Gold, FAQ on ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained,KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug.

23, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/january/13/aco-accountable-care-organizationfaq.aspx.
961d.
97 "The Agencies recognize that not all such ACOs are likely to benefit consumers, and under certain
conditions ACOs could reduce competition and harm consumers through higher prices or lower quality of
care." Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating
in
the
Medicare
Shared
Savings
Program,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/health-care/276458.pdf.
98 Id. at 4. The DOJ and FTC have specified the standards for financial and clinical and integration
elsewhere in a range of statements and opinions.
991d. at5.
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tied together, (2) find evidence of a coercive tie, (3) find market power in
the tying market, and (4) determine that the alleged anticompetitive harms
create a substantial amount of harm in the secondary market and are
neither legal business tactics nor outweighed by pro-competitive effects.
Proving each of these elements will be a challenge and will require
significant economic and legal analysis.
The first element may be the most difficult to prove. If two separate
geographic regions attract entirely different groups of consumers, with
very few patients traveling to the other location, it seems apparent that
health services in each region constitute distinct products-an argument
that aligns with the general justifications for prohibiting tying. 100 Still, the
case law is unclear as to whether an unlawful tie can exist where the two
products constitute the same services but in different geographic markets.
In Jefferson Parish, a seminal tying case, the Court wrote that it "follows
from the underlying rationale of the rule against tying" that "two
distinguishable product markets" must be involved. 01' This definition does
not clarify whether the differentiation between product markets can
include geographic distinctions, and courts have not directly addressed this
question in the context of tying. Furthermore, it is possible that a court
might view a hospital network's geographic market as a single, broad
market-perhaps covering the entire State of California or even the entire
United States-if the hospital proves that a broad market "reflects the
reality of the way in which [it] built and conduct[s] [its] business."' 0 2 In
spite of each hospital's local activities, if the network is viewed as
operating on a larger scale, courts may see it as a single entity, simply
negotiating to get the best deals possible and therefore not engaging in
unlawful tying. 10 3 Nonetheless, if there is economic proof of distinct
consumer demand for each geographic market-which may exist as
employers putting together a health plan often demand providers within a
specific geographic region-there is an argument that that should be
sufficient to prove the existence of two separate, tie-able products under
10 4
the separate products test.

100 Tying arrangements are forbidden because "[tihey deny competitors free access to the market for the
tied product .... [and] buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products." N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,6 (1958).
101 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984).
102 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966).
103 See id.at 575. In Grinnell, the Court found that an accredited central station service operated in a
national geographic market because its planning, inspection, certification, rate-making, pricing, and terms
were all set on a national level-despite the fact that "rates may be varied to meet local conditions." Id.
104 See Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 21-22.
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The Supreme Court has found similar-though not entirely
analogous-situations to be violations of antitrust law. In United States v.
Griffith, four affiliated movie theater companies vastly increased their
market share over a period of five years in the late 1930s, seeing an
increase from having theaters in 37 towns-57% of which had only a
single theater and thus no competition-to 85 towns-62% of which were
without competition.10 5 The corporations faced allegations that they had
used their market power in the closed markets (that is, those without
competition) to gain exclusive privileges from movie distributors in other
markets. 10 6 The Court found that this behavior violated antitrust law, but it
did so under the (presently disfavored) theory of monopoly leveraging
rather than under a theory of unlawful tying. 10 7 This was likely due to the
fact that the companies did not appear to have threatened not to deal with
the distributors in the towns where they had a monopoly subject to their
dealing with them in the competitive markets. Nonetheless, the Court's
reasoning is useful:
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands
the entrance for all films into that area. If he uses that strategic
position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has
competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as a trade
weapon against his competitors. It may be a feeble,
ineffective weapon where he has only one closed or monopoly
town. But as those towns increase in number throughout a
region, his monopoly power in them may be used with crushing
effect on competitors in other places.. . . When the buying
power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate films for his
competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using monopoly
power to expand his empire.
The consequence of such a use of monopoly power is that films
are licensed on a non-competitive basis in what would otherwise
be competitive situations. That is the effect whether one
exhibitor makes the bargain with the distributor or whether two
or more exhibitors lump together their buying power, as
appellees did here. 10 8

105 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101-02 (1948).
106 Id. at 103-04.
107 See infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text (discussing the monopoly leveraging theory).
108 Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107-08.
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The Court went on to note that, though "[l]arge-scale buying" is not
unlawful per se because of the potential efficiencies it can create, such
conduct for the purpose of either monopolization or "stifl[ing] competition
by denying competitors less favorably situated access to the market" is
unlawful. 10 9 This indicates that, despite finding liability under Section
Two of the Sherman Act in Griffith, the Court might be willing to view
110
similar conduct as a restraint of trade under Section One.
However, another well-known tying case, Times-PicayunePublishing
Co. v. United States, provides an argument that two distinct markets for
the same hospital network's services may not be separate products because
they belong to the same network. In that case, the Court found that a
morning and evening newspaper constituted the same product in the eyes
of advertisers; despite the fact that "readers consciously distinguished
between these two publications," the advertisers did not differentiate
between the customers but rather generally sought to increase their
customer coverage by advertising in both newspapers.1 ' Thus, because
"two newspapers under single ownership at the same place, time, and
terms [sold] indistinguishable products to advertisers," there were no
separate tying and tied products. 1 2 Even if different readers might
purchase the two newspapers, the Court seemed to view the relevant
customer base as the advertisers seeking simply to expand their reach and
increase the number of (in their view) fungible consumers, without regard
for differences between those consumers. This could be analogous to an
insurer contracting with a hospital network to expand its reach; the insurer
does not distinguish between consumers based on geographic location but
only seeks to sell to more customers." 3 Under this reasoning, depending
on how inherently different a court determines the two markets to be, it
might view all of a hospital network's services as a single product in the
eyes of insurers seeking to expand their consumer base.
Another illustrative example is the unreported case Austrian v.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc." 4 In that case, individual physicians challenged
a dominant insurer's practice of imposing an all-or-nothing requirement
109 Id. at 108.
110 Although the Griffith Court did not expand on its statement, it suggested that the companies, "having
combined with each other and with the distributors ... formed a conspiracy in violation of §§ 1 and 2." Id. at
109 (emphasis added).
Ill Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953).
112 Id. at 614.
113 Insurance companies do in some cases distinguish between customers with different health
expectations, which may be influenced by geography. The connection to geography, however, is tenuous
and is not the crux of the coverage decision, and thus it is largely irrelevant for purposes of this discussion.
114 Austrian v. Unitedl-ealth Group, Inc., 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1949 (July 17, 2007).
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that the physicians accept all of its health plans.' 1 5 The court held that the
tying allegation was too general and that there was no proof of a
foreclosure of competition in a distinct product market, finding that "only
one market [was] involved."' 1 6 The market in that case included "managed
care organizations operating in the [same geographic] market;" despite
having different contractual terms, the court decided that their services
were "legally indistinguishable. '" 11 7 This case offers insight into how
difficult it is to prove a tying claim between two similar products-but it
leaves open the question of whether two managed care organizations
operating in different markets would be indistinguishable. Because this
issue has not been thoroughly vetted by the courts, to justify a finding of
liability a court would have to carefully analyze the pro- and
anticompetitive aspects of an all-or-nothing arrangement, as well as the
market power and coercive tactics of the defendant.
The second element of a tying claim, coercion, may also be difficult
to prove. Even if a court finds there are two separate products capable of
being tied, there must be evidence that the tie actually coerced the health
plan to purchase the tied product. This is a difficult feat when the purchase
is the result of negotiations. In one health care case alleging that a hospital
required third party payers "to contract for outpatient surgery services on
an exclusive basis as a condition for contracting for general inpatient acute
care hospital services on a discounted basis," the court found that there
was no coercion because "the exclusive contracts, unreasonably restrictive
or not, were the product of negotiation."' "18 The court based this decision
on testimony that the insurer had agreed to the contracts, in spite of their
restrictive nature, as a business decision to avoid severing its relationship
with the hospital." 9 Consequently, if a health plan might have purchased
the product even without the tie-the difference being only the amount it
paid-there may be a strong argument against the existence of coercion.
However, studies of provider-insurer negotiations in several metropolitan
areas throughout the country have demonstrated that networks with
dominant hospitals often exercise significant leverage over health plans,
making their negotiations one-sided and forcing the health plans to
contract with their non-dominant hospitals as well.' 20 If empirical research
demonstrated a similarly anticompetitive impact in the market under
115 Id. at"5.
116 Id. at *32.
117 Id. at*32-33.
118 Rome Ambulatory Surgical Ctr. v.Rome Mem.Hosp., 349 F.Supp. 2d 389,407-08 (N.D.N.Y.2004).
119 Id. at408.
120 See generally Berenson etal., supra note 5.
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scrutiny, there would be a stronger argument that these ties are coercive.
Performing such a study may be a logical starting point to build evidence
of the anticompetitive effects of this conduct in individual states.
The third element, market power, will require intense analysis of the
control a certain provider has in the alleged tying market. As discussed
above, this analysis must not only clearly define the relevant geographic
market, but it must also take note of factors beyond just market share such
as market-based and regulatory barriers to entry.' 2 1 Given the difficulty in
measuring market power in the health care market, there must be thorough
economic analysis of the actual power held by any given networkdefendant.
Finally, the fourth element asks whether a substantial amount of
commerce in the tied product has been affected in a way that is harmful to
competition. The answer to this question will depend on the balance of
pro- and anti-competitive effects in the secondary market. Such procompetitive effects may include the fact that these arrangements enable an
entire system of hospitals to negotiate with insurers rather than just the
ones the insurers find "important.' 22 Additional benefits may be found in
the efficiency and quality improvements that arise from an integrated
system. 2 3 These improvements often arise from cross-subsidization
between hospitals and better coordination between physicians and
administrators at multiple locations.' 2 4 For example, the Massachusetts
Special Commission noted that its recommendations to prohibit these
contracting practices "may not apply" in situations where those practices
allow for more efficient delivery and better-managed costs, so they
"should be reevaluated" in light of market changes. ' 2 5
Still, the anticompetitive effects of these ties are vast, and the DOJ
and FTC's guidelines on enforcement against ACOs draw a line in the
sand to help distinguish between efficient and harmful business practices.
Geographic ties force health plans to accept hospital networks' rates and
thereby cut short the negotiation process; as a result, health plans lose the
ability to set market-rate prices for distinct services. They pass this loss on
to consumers, who lack knowledge about the prices they pay. On this
basis, a strong argument can be made that these practices are more harmful
121 See supra Part I.C.
122 Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 702 (describing how hospital networks leverage the fact that health
plans seek out their "must-have" hospitals to negotiate beneficial rates).
123 Id. at 5.
124 See, e.g., IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 44, ch. 3, at 39-40; Berenson et al., supra note 5, at

977.
125 Mass. Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs., supra note 93, at 25.
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than efficient. If a claim on these grounds is successful, it may help
illuminate the true market value of hospital services and alleviate these
market inefficiencies.
A geographic tying claim holds the potential to break down the
market power that certain dominant hospital networks use to control
prices, and a successful lawsuit could pave the way for a price
transparency initiative to mandate the revelation of prices without the
worry of unintended collusion. However, due to the challenges inherent in
alleging a new variation on an old legal theory, an allegation of geographic
tying will require serious dedication if it is to succeed. Currently, one
group of litigants has raised this claim (among others), in the California
lawsuit Sidibe v. Sutter Health."16 As Sidibe progresses, it will be a case to
watch to see just how willing courts will be to address the harm caused by
these business practices using the framework provided by the antitrust
laws.
2. Bundling Services
Another potentially unlawful tie in the health care market is
hospitals' bundling of services in their negotiations with payers, which
effectively masks the prices of individual services. It should be noted, of
course, that bundling services has been one of the leading cost-saving
techniques proposed in discussions about health care reform, and rightly
so: Bundling can save consumers money when it appropriately "align[s]
incentives for providers.' 2 7 By grouping, for example, all services that are
a part of a single course of treatment or episode of care into a single
payment, such a payment structure can encourage a team of providers to
strive for quality care rather than quantity of care, thus simultaneously
28
lowering costs and improving quality.'
These same benefits, however, do not arise when services that are not
related to a single illness are grouped together for payment purposes.
Instead, that grouping makes it impossible for purchasers to distinguish
discrete services to arrive at their fair market value. Thus, a bundling
challenge should focus on revealing how a tie between unrelated services
9
harms consumer welfare and increases the provider's market power."2 If
126 Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. 3:12-cv-4854-LB,
at 12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).
127 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact Sheet: Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2011-Fact-SheetsItems/2011-08-23.html.
128 Id.
129 See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 876 n.86. This ensures that the products are viewed as two
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services are not used together by consumers, the arguments in favor of
pricing them together decrease significantly, leaving little justification for
a coercive tie.
It is often profitable for a dominant provider to bundle unrelated
services, because doing so allows it to "make a precommitment to tie" that
strengthens its hold on the tied market. 130 Bundling has the potential to
harm competition by concealing the prices of individual services;
separating the prices of discrete services would allow insurers to negotiate
the reimbursement rate for each service individually, thereby enabling
competitive pricing for services for which good substitutes exist rather
than forcing insurers to accept a bundled rate. 131 As a result, as Professors
Havighurst and Richman argue, hospitals that want to "fully exploit [their]
various monopolies" would be forced to reveal prices for individual
services to insurers and to the marketplace. 132 Insurers could then use this
information to adopt policies and create incentives that would encourage
133
consumers to seek out lower costs for specific procedures.
As with the geographic tying claim proposed above, however, this
theory of bundling as a potential antitrust violation will face many speed
bumps if alleged in court. The first bump in the road is the first element of
the test for tying: the separate products test. Hospital services are often
viewed as a single product rather than as individual products. 134 Thus,
proving the existence of two separate products capable of being tied
together would be a significant legal hurdle. To prevail on this claim
would require economic analysis of the markets for each hospital service
(or set of related hospital services) and of consumers' demands for those
services to establish that they are distinct products.
A second challenge is proving the element of coercion-that is, clear
evidence that the insurer would not have purchased the tied product but for
the unlawful restraint. As with geographic tying, the fact that the health
plan might have entered into a contract whether or not the services were
bundled could prove problematic for a plaintiff.' 35 Similarly, the third
distinct products. Economic analysis suggests that it is not profitable for a monopolist to tie a
complementary product to its monopolized product, therefore making such a claim unlikely to succeed;
however, "where the monopolized product is no longer essential for all uses of the non-monopolized
components, tying once again emerges as a profitable exclusionary strategy." Michael D. Whinston, Tying,
Foreclosure,and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 840 (1990).
130 Whinston, supra note 90, at 839 ("By bundling components of its system together . . . firms can
precommit to their marketing strategy.").

131 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 876.
132 Id. at 876-77.
133 Id. at 877.
134 See supranotes 39-42 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
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element, market power, will require the same kind of thorough economic
analysis of the provider's market share and control over the tying
136
service.
Finally, to establish the tie has a harmful effect on a substantial
amount of commerce, it is necessary to overcome the argument that
bundling is often pro-competitive and therefore not unlawful. Arguments
about the pro-competitive character of bundling arrangements center on
the economic efficiencies they create that allow providers to bargain for
lower prices that they can then pass on to consumers. 137 For instance,
bundling may allow for the cross-subsidization of services that otherwise
might be prohibitively expensive. 138 It also helps avoid the problem of feefor-service payment that can incent overtreatment.1 39 In fact, bundling was
a focus of the Affordable Care Act due to its ability, at least in some cases,
to reduce fragmentation in health care and thereby improve the
140
coordination of health care-in turn lowering overall costs.
But if, on the other hand, these ties create barriers that prevent
competitors from introducing better, cheaper competing products, to the
4
detriment of consumers, they should be considered anticompetitive.1 1 If
health plans were better able to distinguish between the prices of different
services, they would be able to provide better coverage for patients willing
to accept narrower networks. 14 2 Together with price transparency, this
could give consumers significantly more power in the health care market
than they have now. Analyzing the impact of bundling on consumer costs
in a specific market, the availability of alternatives, and the ease of entry
into the market-in addition to the initial determination of whether the
provider has market power in the relevant market-will therefore provide
crucial facts in laying out a case for antitrust liability under this theory.
3. Full-Line Forcing
A slightly different way to frame the ties between health care services
and/or markets is as a form of tying known as full-line forcing. Often used
in the context of retail distribution, full-line forcing occurs when a seller
136 See supra Part I.C.
137 IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 44, at 100.
138 Id. at 39-40.
139 See generally SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US
SICKER AND POORER (2008).
140 See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 127.
141 See id; see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 (Apr.
2007) (describing a de facto tying arrangement as one where the bundled products are priced such that it is
better for consumers to purchase them together than separately, resulting in higher consumer costs).
142 Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 877.
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requires a retailer to "take and display a full or 'representative' line of the
seller's products in order to obtain a desired product." 143 This is arguably
analogous to the practice of forcing a health plan to purchase all of a
provider's services or to contract with all of its hospitals in a region,
although most full-line forcing cases involve retail distribution and
therefore may be distinguishable from the provision of health care services
through insurance plans. Courts tend to uphold full-line forcing
arrangements, particularly when the arrangements are not exclusive,
because of the benefits in distribution efficiency they provide. 144 If the
products that the retailer is forced to purchase are unrelated to those it
initially wanted, however, "the reasonableness of this requirement to buy
the whole line would be suspect." ' 45 For example, in a case involving ties
between tractors and haying equipment, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that full-line forcing is always permissible, finding that the
circumstances under which such an arrangement does not violate the law
"probably do not include cases in which coercion is applied to secure
146
compliance with the full-line requirement.
If hospital networks' practice of leveraging their power in one service
or market is viewed as full-line forcing, the justification for allowing the
practice does not hold. As discussed above, when hospital systems coerce
the purchase of their services, the factual and economic evidence suggests
that full-line forcing does not produce the efficiencies that it does in
analogous distribution arrangements. On the contrary, if there were proof
that these practices result in "higher prices and outlays for medical
services," there would be a strong argument that they are anticompetitive
and harmful to consumers.' 47 Therefore, in addition to a classical tying
argument, full-line forcing may-in spite of its disfavor in some courtsbe another potential argument to use to challenge hospital network ties. 148

B. Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
Alternatively, if this behavior is not enough to constitute an illegal
tie, it may give rise to liability under Section Two of the Sherman Act if it
represents willful maintenance of monopoly power and/or a willful attempt
143 1-22 ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATION Tying Arrangements § 22.05(2) (Matthew Bender &
Co., 2d ed. 2012).
144 Id.

145 Id.
146 Earley Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 556 F. Supp. 544, 550-51 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
147 AM. BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 266 (4th ed. 2010).
148 Id.("There are no decisions discussing this issue, but full line forcing policies such as this may become

a fertile ground for future health care antitrust litigation.").
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to monopolize.' 49 This is most relevant in the context of geographic tying
where a hospital network with a monopoly in one market attempts to gain
market power in a separate market while simultaneously seeking to
maintain its monopoly in the first market. As alleged in Sidibe v. Sutter
Health, this could represent both willful maintenance of monopoly power
50
(in the tying market) and attempted monopolization (in the tied market).'
The monopolization claim would require proof that the hospital network
had a monopoly in the tying market, which could be shown by analyzing
market share and ability to control prices in the relevant market, as
52
discussed above, 15 1 and that it willfully maintained that monopoly.'
Proving willful maintenance would require evidence that the ties were
created in order to preserve the monopoly and not for another valid
business purpose. 15 3 Any allegedly valid business purposes would likely
mirror the pro-competitive benefits described as potential responses to a
Section One claim.
Alternatively, to prove an attempted monopolization claim, there
must be evidence of anticompetitive conduct, specific intent to
monopolize, and a "dangerous probability" that the attempt will succeed.
However, even if the tying arrangements are found to be anticompetitive
and made with the requisite specific intent, proving a "dangerous
probability" of success will be a challenge-though not an insurmountable
one-without compelling economic data that the tied hospital poses a
serious threat of becoming dominant in the tied market. This practice may
alternatively be viewed under a monopoly leveraging theory, under which
liability can arise from using one's monopoly power in one market to gain
a competitive advantage in another market.' 54 However, circuit courts are
split as to whether monopoly leveraging can exist without the
monopolization or attempted monopolization of the second market. 55 On
this issue, the Supreme Court recently wrote that proving a monopoly
leveraging claim requires evidence that there is a dangerous probability of
149 See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 575
F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that, although there was no illegal tie, the defendant engaged in behavior
that constituted a willful maintenance of monopoly power and violated Section Two of the Sherman Act).
150 Third Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. 3:12-cv-4854-LB,
at 12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).
151 See supra Part I.C.

152 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 653, 570-71 (1966).
153 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992).
154 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948).
155 2-25 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION Actual Monopolization § 25.04 (Matthew Bender &
Co., 2d ed. 2012). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the monopoly leveraging theory, requiring instead
that there be an actual or attempted monopoly in the second market. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1991).
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success of monopolization in the second market.' 5 6 Thus, this claim would
need the same evidence as a stand-alone Section Two claim for
monopolization or attempted monopolization, which would require the
difficult factual showing of monopolization or a "dangerous probability of
success" thereof in the second market, not just in the first. Therefore, this
claim could be feasible but may be met with limited success.
C. Unfair Competition
Finally, even if these practices of linking unrelated services to build
up leverage during negotiations fail to satisfy one or more of the elements
of the claims described above, a plaintiff could still find refuge in state
unfair competition law. In California specifically, "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice" could give rise to a claim under the
UCL, 157 if that practice "threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law,
or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws."' 5 8 Therefore, a
technical failure to meet the separate products test or to prove coercion
may not be fatal if a court is willing to view these practices as violative of
the "spirit" of the antitrust laws, depending on the relevant state law. In
light of the substantial harm to competition evidenced by the unpredictable
and out-of-control prices of health care, in combination with the unfair and
unethical approach that some dominant firms have taken to raise and
maintain those prices, a court could be justified, particularly in some of the
most egregious cases, in making a finding of liability.
CONCLUSION: BEST APPROACHES TO LITIGATION,
REGULATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Regulators have many options when it comes to choosing a legal
strategy to address the inefficiencies in the health care market. Using
antitrust law, they can challenge anticompetitive contract terms like MFN
clauses as unreasonable restraints of trade enacted by dominant insurers.
Alternatively, they can tackle the geographic ties that hospital networks
leverage to expand their market power into more and more locales, relying
either on a theory of tying or attempted monopolization, or bringing suit
under a state unfair competition law. Bundled services that are not
functionally related pose yet another risk to market efficiency, for many of
the same reasons as geographic ties, although there may be policy
156 Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004).
157 CAL. CIV. CODE § 17200.
158 Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 565 (1999).
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arguments in favor of grouping these services together. Of these practices,
geographic ties seem to present the greatest anticompetitive concerns with
the fewest pro-competitive benefits, due to their ability to grant greater
power and market expansion to already-dominant hospital networkswhich economic evidence suggests are some of the biggest causes of high
health care prices-while offering no clear benefit to patients. Thus, this
would be a logical focal point for regulators or consumers who are seeking
a way to break down the market power that allows these hospital networks
to keep the true price of their services not only high, but also hidden from
consumers.
Given the trepidation with which courts have approached issues of
competition in health care, it is not clear whether any of the litigation
strategies described in this article will succeed. But the lack of a clear
precedent does not mean that legal efforts are in vain. Take, for example,
the challenges against Blue Cross of Michigan's MFN clauses. Though the
DOJ's lawsuit will not result in a courtroom victory, the litigation spurred
the passage of regulatory measures to prohibit MFN clauses. By
highlighting these kinds of problematic behaviors, the antitrust agencies
can raise awareness of unfair business practices and motivate legislators to
do something about them. In California, the recently filed class action
against Sutter Health may similarly heighten legislative concerns about
geographic tying. If state government officials pay attention to these
allegations, they may supplement the private lawsuit with a state antitrust
challenge or legislative efforts to increase competition. And as private
companies see these lawsuits play out, perhaps they will see that their
current practices are not sustainable in a regulatory environment that views
fair pricing practices as a critical element of health care ethics.
Moreover, to improve the possibility of success and accuracy in
breaking down market power, economists and policy analysts can also
offer their expertise. As a starting point, one group of researchers studied
twelve U.S. communities to understand how some hospital systems have
used their leverage to negotiate high rates from insurers. 159 This kind of
research should be repeated in target markets where there is evidence
suggestive of similar practices. In doing so, researchers will be able to
build the strong economic evidence of competitive harm that is necessary
to succeed in an antitrust suit.
By taking steps to bring targeted lawsuits, to spur action from local
and state governments, and to conduct empirical studies, it is possible to
heighten the discourse about anticompetitive behaviors in the health care
159 See generally Berenson et al., supra note 5.
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market-and perhaps, in doing so, to gain additional policy attention and
financial resources. In light of the U.S. health policy community's focus
on reducing wasteful health care spending generally, and improving price
transparency specifically, there should be plenty of room for a pinpointed
focus on the harmful business practices that are driving these
inefficiencies.
Even if a lawsuit is ultimately unsuccessful, the discordance between
the justifications behind antitrust law (the protection of the consumer) and
the realities of the health care market (the near-total lack of consumer
power) makes it clear that there is a need for action. Whether that action is
ultimately a litigation strategy or a regulatory or policy effort, or a
combination thereof, it should address the inefficient and harmful practices
that powerful players in the health care market use to artificially drive up
the cost of health care-not only for individual patients, but also for the
entire nation. Bringing attention to this serious competitive harm can
reduce the consolidation of market power and lower prices for consumers.
At the same time, it can make way for price transparency and other
important policy initiatives that would be difficult to implement under
current market conditions. Antitrust law thus offers a first step toward
making U.S. health care affordable, efficient, and fair for everyone.

